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DISCLOSURE OF PRELIMINARY MERGER
NEGOTIATIONS UNDER RULE 10b-5
The corporate community has been mired for the last several years in one
of its cyclical preoccupations with mergers and other acquisitive ventures.
In 1985 alone, $72 billion changed hands in mergers and acquisitions
involving publicly traded corporations. I Rule 10b-52, which was promul-
gated under section 103 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
Exchange Act), requires the eventual disclosure of both the existence of
negotiations and the terms of a proposed merger. The participants in
mergers and acquisitions usually attempt to avoid early disclosure of the
negotiations, because of its dramatic effect on the market and the negotiat-
ing process. 4 Despite management's attempts, however, the news usually
leaks out. Substantial increases in price and volume of shares traded occur
before any public announcement is made. Investors' subsequent fortunes
depend on how early they discover the negotiations and the extent to which
they draw accurate conclusions from the increased market activity.
The law regarding disclosure of merger negotiations is unsettled. 5 Re-
1. Decline in Public Targets, MERG. & ACQUIS., Sept./Oct. 1986, at 24.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985). Rule lOb-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumen-
tality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device
or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
4. FreundMergersandAcquisitions, Nat'lL.J., Nov. 11, 1985, at 13, col. 1. Established companies
are in great demand today. The parties to the negotiations have to worry about competing offers once the
deal is disclosed. The parties' goal is to "negotiate in private in order to arrive at a point where, when the
world finds out something's happening, it's as close to a done deal as possible-with the undone parts
getting taken care of posthaste." Id. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
5. See SECIssuesReport to ClarifyPolicy on Disclosure ofMergerNegotiations, 17 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 1229 (1985); SECOpposesPriceStructureRuleinPublicCompanyMergers, 17 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 1395 (1985).
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cently, the Third Circuit held that merger negotiations are immaterial as a
matter of law, and need not be disclosed until agreement is reached on price
and post-merger structure, regardless of whether the corporation has made
any previous statements on the subject. 6 The SEC vigorously disputes that
contention, 7 and has found support from the Sixth Circuit in Levinson v.
Basic, Inc., 8 which held that a "no corporate development" statement
when merger negotiations are occurring is misleading.
The present formulation of the law takes an overly simplistic approach to
disclosure during merger negotiations. This Comment argues that dis-
closure rules should be standardized to accommodate competing concerns
related to investor protection and predictability for management.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Market Impact of Merger Negotiations: Empirical Evidence
Merger negotiations seldom remain a secret for long after they begin.
Unusual market activity immediately preceding announcements of mer-
gers and takeovers is widely recognized as the rule, not the exception. The
prevalence of unusual market activity and the size of the market's reaction
have been confirmed empirically.
In one study by Keown and Pinkerton, the daily returns on stock of 195
successfully acquired firms were examined for the period of three months
before through one month after public announcement. 9 The study showed
that, on the average, significant abnormal returns ° started to accumulate
about one month before the first public announcement. "Uncontrolled
abuse of Rule lOb-5" began five to eleven days prior to the announcement
date. I I Approximately half of the market's reaction to the merger occurred
before any disclosure was made. 12 Likewise, volumes of shares traded over
6. Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985).
7. Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, in Connection with
Pending Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Rehearing In (sic] Banc, Michaels v. Michaels, 767
F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 797 (1986) [hereinafter SEC Amicus Brief].
8. 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986).
9. Keown & Pinkerton, Merger Announcements and Insider Trading Activity: An Empirical
Investigation, 36 J. FIN. 855 (1981). Unlike previous studies, which had centered upon cumulative
abnormal returns, the authors calculated a daily rate of return on the sample, and then compared it to a
daily market model to estimate abnormal returns. They hypothesized that systematic abnormal returns
would be expected if there were leaks of the merger information. Id. at 858.
10. See infra note 28 for a discussion of abnormal returns.
11. Keown & Pinkerton, supra note 9, at 863.
12. Id. at 866. Most of the remaining reaction occurred on the disclosure date. Only five percent
occurred after the disclosure date. Id.
Another study that examined the daily price changes yielded essentially the same results but with a
different emphasis. See Dodd, Merger Proposals, Management Discretion and Stockholder Wealth, 8
J. FIN. EcoN. 105 (1980) (When merger proposal is announced but management vetoes it, stock of target
Vol. 62:81, 1987
Disclosure of Merger Negotiations
the three week period before public announcement were at least 100
percent higher than for the same period three months earlier. 13
Another study by the same authors compared the trading patterns of
merger stocks in general with the trading patterns of those companies
involved in the Antoniu Newman insider trading cases. 14 The study indi-
cated that the price changes in the Antoniu Newman sample were typical of
merger candidates. 15 It indicated that, on the average, 62 percent of the
premium offered by the merger was exhausted prior to the first public
announcement, compared to 52.6 percent for the master sample. 16
Both studies concluded that, to the extent the abnormal returns were
exploited by insiders, the trading was illegal. 17 It is likely that a significant
portion of the abnormal returns, however, did not result from trading
directly on information from inside sources. 18 Once the price of the stock
starts to rise, market observers, who may have already identified the target
as a likely acquisition candidate, draw the obvious conclusions and start to
purchase the stock.
In addition, early disclosure of inside information about merger negotia-
tions figures prominently in the calculations of the investment bankers
corporation shows permanent upward revaluation). For less systematic evidence of widespread trading,
see Merjos, Who Knew What When?, BARRONS, July 19, 1982, at 32.
13. Keown & Pinkerton, supra note 9, at 863. Not surprisingly, very little of this trading was
conducted directly by registered insiders. Id. The study also found little significant differences between
the trading patterns of over the counter stocks and stocks listed on a registered exchange. Both samples
exhibited abnormal returns. Id. at 864-65 (Figures 3 and 4).
14. Keown, Pinkerton, Young & Hansen, Recent SEC Prosecution and Insider Trading on Forth-
coming Merger Announcements, 13 J. Bus. REs. 329 (1985). Adrian Antoniu worked in the merger
department of Morgan Stanley. He was convicted of passing information concerning 18 merger candi-
dates to his co-conspirators, who purchased stock and split the subsequent profits with him. Id. at 330.
15. Id. at 335.
16. Id. at333-35.
17. Keown &Pinkerton, supra note 9, at866; Keown, Pinkerton, Young& Hansen, supra note 14, at
335. Othercommentators have been critical of this contention, as well as of Keown and Pinkerton's entire
approach. They assert that Keown and Pinkerton disregard the "plausible alternative hypothesis" that
price changes are caused by responses to public information that increases the probability of a takeover.
The commentators also suggest that characterizing public announcement as something that happens on a
single day is naive. Public disclosure, they say, usually operates as a series of events that increase the
probability of a takeover. SeeJensen & Ruback, TheMarketforCorporate Control, 11 J. FIN. EcON. 5, 14
n.6 (1983).
Up until about two weeks before the public announcement, that conclusion seems warranted. It is
unlikely, however, that public information would produce the dramatic price increases and abnormal
returns that take place for two weeks prior to disclosure.
Furthermore, even if effective public announcement is prolonged overseveral days, that state of affairs
involves a significant amount of unfairness to investors who are not in a position to know about the events
preceding public disclosure on the national level.
18. See Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on Regulation of
Insider Trading, Part I: Regulation Under the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 41 Bus. LAw. 223, 224 (1985). See also Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphey, InitialInquiry into the
Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1973).
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employed to calculate a premium price to offer shareholders in a tender
offer. Investment bankers generally base the stock price from which they
calculate the premium on the market value at a point ranging from four
months to two weeks before the first public disclosure, solely to compen-
sate for possible leaks of the negotiations. 19
B. The Negotiation Scenario
Although the hostile contest for control is more prominent in the public
eye, most acquisitions are friendly, negotiated deals.20 Because of the
publicity problems, once the negotiations begin, they usually proceed as
rapidly as possible to agreement in principle. 2 1 After agreement is reached,
mergers may proceed to closing at varying rates of speed. Increasingly, the
agreement stipulates some sort of penalty if one side backs out.2 2
Unlike the parties to a hostile tender offer, both the buyer and the seller in
a friendly acquisition have a similar interest in secrecy; in particular, both
sides want to avoid public disclosure until the agreement to merge is
finalized and binding. Public disclosure produces an immediate increase in
the price of the target's stock.23
Premature disclosure will lessen the apparent size of the premium, thus
increasing the risk that shareholders will not approve the transaction. If an
overly optimistic market miscalculates the anticipated size of the premium,
the share price may rise above the price that the buyer was willing to pay.
The buyer may be forced to raise the price, or may abandon the deal
altogether. Disclosure may act as a catalyst for alternate bids on less
favorable terms for the seller's management. It may also serve to put the
target up for auction on more favorable terms. This may be advantageous
for the target, but for the acquiring corporation it represents great trouble
and expense with no return.
At the same time, management faces constant, and often intense pressure
to disclose information or confirm rumors. The ability of corporate man-
agement to control disclosure in such situations is often illusory. Analysts,
19. See Penn, Premiums, What Do They Really Measure?, MERG. & ACQuis., Fall, 1981, at 30. See
also Profits from Picking Merger Targets, Bus. WK., Jan. 14, 1980, at 101; Laws, Risk and Reward,
BARRONS, Nov. 30, 1981, at 9.
20. See Roundtable: Strategies ofTakeoverAttack andDefense, MERG. & AcQuis., Winter, 1985,at
24; Dealmakers Cut Failure Rate, MERG. & AcQuis., Spring, 1985, at 23.
21. Freund, supra note 4, at 22.
22. Id.
23. Empirical evidence suggests that on the day ofofficial disclosure, the target's stock rises to a price
that represents the price to be paid in connection with the merger, discounted by the possibility that the
deal will fall through. See Asquith, MergerBids, Uncertainty, andStockholderReturns, 11 J. FItN. ECON.
51, 66 (1983). Only five percent of the market's reaction to the news occurs after the day of disclosure. See
Keown & Pinkerton, supra note 9, at 866.
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brokers and institutional investors enjoy relatively easy access to manage-
ment and information. 24 This access may create enormous difficulties if
management wants to keep the negotiations secret and at the same time
avoid selective disclosure. 25
Most large public corporations have well-developed analyst relations
programs that promote the company's stock by providing information on
the management quality and the prospects of the company.26 Likewise,
financial analysts and brokers are compensated in part for the contacts they
are able to maintain with corporate executives. 27 The SEC and the ex-
changes advise publicly traded corporations to maintain an "open door"
policy with respect to analyst relations.28 The rationale is that analysts will
receive and study small bits of non-material information from the ex-
ecutives, and will be able to make observations about investment value.29
This type of analysis has a positive effect on the efficiency of the market.
However, disclosure of merger negotiations is not what the SEC has in
mind when it encourages exchange of information. Unfortunately, effective
disclosure to such experts is seldom avoidable. For the analyst who is
accustomed to candor from executives, anything the executive says will
often result in effective disclosure. The extent of disclosure of confidential
information in such cases is a function of the skill and persistence of the
analyst and the public relations finesse of the executive.30
Shareholders, primarily of the target corporation, are caught in the
middle of this situation. Their interests are largely adverse to management
interests until public disclosure is made. News of a possible merger is
24. SeeAnders, Here'sHowStock-MarketExpertsDecide WhichRumorstoActOn, Wall St. J.,Feb.
4,1986, at 29. But see Boland, SEC Chimera: Mom, Pop andArbMadeEqual, Wall St. J., Feb. 19,1986,
at 30 (equal access to information an unattainable and undesirable regulatory goal); O'Donnell, Silence
Was Golden, FORBES, Oct. 8, 1984, at 41 ("They [small investors] have made a lot of money as it is, so
they'rereally notlosing. They'rejust notgetting that final littleshot.") (quoting an anonymous investment
analyst).
25. See 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURTIS AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 9.17, at 9-66 (1984)
(policy of "ad hoc disclosures" is "fraught with peril"); Williams, Corporate Publicity, in FOURTH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURrmS REGULATION 391,407 (1973).
26. See Bean, Dealing With the Financial Community and Changing Markets, REPRESENTING
PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS (PLI), 73, 82 (1984). See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635
F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
27. Solomon & Wilke, Securities Professionals and Rule 10b-5: Legal Standards, Industry Prac-
tices, Preventative Guidelines and Proposals for Reform, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 505, 516-17 (1975).
28. Investors Management Co., Exchange Act Release No. 9267, [1971] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
78,163, at 80,521 (July 29,1971); New York Stock Exchange Company Manual § 202.02, reprinted in
3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 23,513, at 17,211 [hereinafter NYSE Company Manual]; American Stock
Exchange Company Guide § 402, reprinted in 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 23,124B [hereinafterAMEX
Company Guide].
29. See Investors Management Co., Exchange Act Release No. 9267, [1971] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 78,163, at 80,521 (July 29, 1971).
30. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1977).
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enormously important news to shareholders, because of the potential for
earning a return substantially above the market rate. 31
So long as the news of the merger negotiations remains a secret and no
insiders trade on the information, the average shareholder is not unusually
disadvantaged. However, once unusual increases in price and volume
begin, it is probable that persons with superior information are purchasing
in large volumes from existing shareholders who have not been informed.
C. Rule lOb-5
Rule 1Ob-5 provides that it is unlawful for a person to make an untrue
statement or misleading statement of material fact, or to omit a material fact
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 32 The rule requires
disclosure of material information by corporate management only if there
is a duty to disclose. 33 Management has a duty to correct misleading
statements for which it is responsible. 34 A corporation has a duty to
disclose all material facts before it trades its own stock. 35 Absent such a
duty, disclosure of material developments is within the discretion of corpo-
rate management. Delays in disclosure are governed by the principle that
no duty to disclose arises where management does not have confidence in
the accuracy of the facts in question, or where management has a valid
corporate purpose for delaying disclosure. 36 Only a corporation's "undue
31. One way to evaluate the impact of merger negotiations is to examine the daily stock prices of
target firms during the period of time surrounding the announcement or the conclusion of the transaction.
Abnormal returns represent the difference between actual returns on the stock and the expected returns
calculated by means of a market index. At least thirteen studies have identified and analyzed abnormal
returns on target firm stock prices for a specified period before and after announcement. Their results are
compiled in Jensen & Ruback, supra note 17. Depending on the period of calculation, the average
abnormal returns on mergers range from 13.3% to 33.96%. The studies analyzed market responses to
both mergers and tender offers. Id. at 12-13.
32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
33. See Levinson v. Basic, Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 746 (6th Cir. 1986).
34. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); Electronic Specialty Co. v.
International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
35. Most commentators agree that no court has yet clearly imposed an affirmative duty to disclose all
material information. Voluminous commentary has been generated on the issue of whether an affirmative
duty to disclose should be imposed. See, e.g., Exchange Act Release No. 8995, [1970-1971 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,915 (Oct. 15, 1970); 5A A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5
§ 88.04 (1979); Bauman, Rule lOb-5 and the Corporation's Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEO. L.J.
935 (1979); Talesnick, Corporate Silence and Rule lOb-5: Does a Publicly Held Corporation Have an
Affirmative Obligation to Disclose?, 49 DEN. L.J. 369 (1973); Comment, Disclosure of Material Inside
Information: An Affirmative Corporate Duty?, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 795.
36. See Financial Indus. Fund v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514,518-19 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); SECv. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n. 12 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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delay in bad faith" might trigger liability for failure to disclose. 37
Rule lOb-5 imposes a duty to disclose only material facts. The Supreme
Court has defined a fact as material if "there is a substantial likelihood that
the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations
of the reasonable shareholder." 38
Generally, materiality is an issue of fact.39 In theory, the materiality
issue is only resolved as a matter of law "if a fact is so obviously important
[or unimportant] to the investor that reasonable minds could not differ." 40
If the event is uncertain to occur, the probability that it will occur is
balanced against the potential impact the event will have on the company
and its shareholders. 41
D. Current Controversy Over Merger Disclosure
A recent line of cases attempts to balance the interests of corporate
management in secrecy and the interests of shareholders in knowing about
the presence of merger negotiations. The cases come to different con-
clusions on the following three issues: (1) whether and when merger
negotiations are material developments; (2) when is there a duty to disclose
merger negotiations; and (3) what constitutes a misleading statement in
connection with the disclosure of merger negotiations and how can mis-
leading statements be avoided.
37. Financial Indus. Fund, 474 F.2d at 519. Furthermore, no court has held a corporation which has
been silent liable for "undue delay" when it did not trade.
38. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976).
39. Id. at 450.
40. Id. (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124,1129 (4th Cir. 1970)).
41. SECv. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969). See, e.g. Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464F.2d 876,880 (2d Cir. 1972) (not
error to instruct the jury that defendant had to have "material information as to a reasonably probable
merger").
Some courts have incorporated the effect the information may have on the value of the stock into the
materiality analysis. They suggest that the traditional torts formulation encompasses this idea. See, e.g.,
List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965).
Although most courts insist that the materiality standard is an objective one, TSC Indus. v. Northway,
Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), some commentators contend that a subjective element of materiality
sometimes comes into play, especially when there are identified insiders who are trading. 5 A. JACOBS,
supra note 35, § 61.02[c] (The subjective test measures materiality according to "the actions of persons
possessing the fact in question."). Indications of when information becomes material include the point at
which insiders begin trading, and the vehemence with which management opposes disclosure. Id.; 3B
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 25, § 9.22(2)(f). See also SECv. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851
(2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See generally Hewitt, Developing Concepts
ofMateriality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAW. 887 (1977).
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1. Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.: Preliminary Merger Negotiations Are
Immaterial as a Matter of Law
The controversy over the materiality of merger negotiations stems from
the Third Circuit's holding in Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.42 In Greenfield,
Heublein Corporation began negotiations with Reynolds Corporation to
avert a hostile takeover by another company.43 During the negotiations,
unusual market activity developed. 4 A New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
official called Heublein to determine the source of the activity. 45 A Heublein
representative responded with a statement that management was aware of no
corporate development that would explain the unusual activity.46
The Third Circuit held that preliminary merger negotiations are imma-
terial as a matter of law. 47 The court reasoned that because preliminary
merger negotiations are tentative, disclosure of such negotiations tends to
mislead shareholders. 48 Once agreement in principle is reached, the prob-
42. 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985).
43. Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 753.
44. Id. at 754. Heublein stock rose three and a quarter points. It was not clear that the increase was the
product of a leak about the negotiations. On the day the unusual market activity developed. General
Cinema, the party threatening the hostile takeover, threatened to sell one of its principal assets. Id. The
unusual market activity may have been in response to the belief that General Cinema was finally preparing
to fund a takeover.
45. Id.
46. Id. The plaintiff, a Heublein shareholder who had been observing the developments closely.
interpreted the statement as an indication that the price of the stock had peaked, and issued a sell order. Id.
The day after Greenfield's stock was sold, trading in Heublein stock was suspended and the agreement was
announced. Id. at 755. The plaintiff shareholder sued, alleging that Heublein had withheld information
about the merger negotiations in violation of Rule lOb-5. Id. The district court dismissed on the defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment, Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 575F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
and the Third Circuit affirmed. Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 753.
47. Id. at 756.
48. The Greenfield court relied in large part for its reasoning on an earlier Third Circuit decision,
Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982). In Staffin, Bluebird Corporation made a tender offer
for its own shares without disclosing that it was considering a merger. Id. at 1200-01. The court reasoned
that merger negotiations are immaterial because disclosure tends to mislead investors and does existing
shareholders more harm than good. Id. at 1206. The court relied on testimony and material from the major
stock exchanges explaining the impact of negotiations in the related area oftenderoffers, and the need for
secrecy. The court explained that early disclosure affects the ability of the parties to conclude the
transaction. Disclosure induces the price to rise rapidly toward the expected tender price. Once this
occurs, the buyer may not be able to offer a sufficient premium over the inflated price to induce share-
holders to tender their shares. Id.
Disclosure also induces investors to buy stock at an inflated price, the court said, without considering
the possibility of success. If the transaction collapses. those who bought the stock at the elevated price
have incurred a loss. The rest of the stockholders have lost the opportunity to sell at a premium price. Id. at
1207.
Third, the corporation may not be able to make an adequate statement about the negotiations because if
they are preliminary, the facts are in a constant state of flux. Id. at 1206-07. If, on the other hand, the
negotiations are not disclosed, shareholders still benefit from a premium price if the transaction is
concluded. If it falls through, no one is worse off. Id. at 1207.
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lem of misleading shareholders "yields" to the shareholders' right to know
about the corporation's plans.49
The Greenfield court discussed disclosure in terms of "agreement in
principle,"' 50 concluding that agreement must exist on the fundamental
terms of the merger-price and structure-before there is any duty to
disclose. 51 The court reasoned that management needs definite and usable
standards for determining when it must disclose such negotiations. 52 Other-
wise, it would disclose all the details of merger negotiations prematurely in
order to avoid liability, resulting in investor confusion and disruption of the
market. 53 According to the court, the "no corporate development" state-
ment was not misleading, because Heublein did not omit any material facts
from the statement. 54 Moreover, Heublein did not have indications that
those knowledgeable about the negotiations had leaked them to outsiders.
55
A sharp dissent criticized the majority's emphasis on management needs
at the expense of investor protection. 56 Judge Higginbotham insisted that
when a corporation voluntarily issues a statement calculated to influence
the investing public, it must insure that the statement is not false or
misleading. 57 He found the no corporate development statement false
because management clearly knew of information that could have ac-
counted for the unusual market activity.58 He emphasized that nothing
compels the corporation to make any statement about the negotiations-
not even the call from the NYSE representative. 59
2. The SEC's Position
The SEC has focused on the question of materiality of merger negotia-
tions. It maintains the position that materiality cannot be determined as a
matter of law in merger negotiation cases. The SEC argues that the
materiality of corporate developments should be and has traditionally been
decided on a case by case basis. Merger negotiations are often material
long before agreement on price and structure are reached. 60 According to
49. Greenfield, 742 F2d at 756.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 757.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 759. See infra note 67.
55. Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 759.
56. Id. at 761.
57. Id. at 760-61.
58. Id. at 761. He found unacceptable the result that "Heubleinis free to assume that its confidences
are maintained and accorded complete secrecy, even in the face of otherwise inexplicable investor
activity." Id. at 763.
59. Id. at 761.
60. SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 5-6.
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the SEC, even though there is no duty to disclose material merger negotia-
tions, the corporation has a duty not to make misleading statements about
negotiations once they become important to a reasonable shareholder.
The SEC's position is that a "no corporate development" statement is
misleading. Although a "no comment" response would be acceptable to
the SEC, the negotiations should be disclosed if management chooses to
make a statement. 61 The SEC has announced its intent to take enforcement
action against companies that issue no corporate development statements
during preliminary merger negotiations. 62
3. Levinson v. Basic, Inc.
The SEC's premise has been accepted in part by the Sixth Circuit in
Levinson v. Basic, Inc. 63 In that case, Basic's management issued four no
corporate development statements in response to unusual market activity
over a period of a year and a half during which it negotiated an ultimately
successful merger.64 The court held that a no corporate development
statement is misleading if made during merger negotiations. 65 The court
rejected Greenfield's narrow reading of the no corporate development
statement. Under Greenfield, the no corporate development statement
would be misleading only if management had specific facts to indicate that
the information had been leaked. It was more reasonable, the court said, to
interpret the statement broadly to mean the absence of any significant
developments. 66
61. In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,595-96 (July 8, 1985).
62. Id. at 87,592. As in the Greenfield case, the two companies were involved in preliminary merger
negotiations when unusual market activity developed. Nestle had stipulated that if the talks were pub-
licized, it would discontinue them. Id. at 87,593. The Carnation official who responded to the market
representative, first with a no corporate development statement, and later with a more detailed statement
denying knowledge of negotiations on behalf of Carnation. was actually unaware of the negotiations. Id.
at 87,594. The shares of Carnation stock appreciated 40 percent from the time the negotiations began until
public disclosure. O'Donnell, Silence Was Golden, FORBES, Oct. 8, 1984, at 41.
In connection with a petition for rehearing of a Seventh Circuit case, Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d
1185 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 797 (1986), the SEC also submitted an amicus briefasking the
court to delete dictum stating that merger negotiations between publicly held companies were immaterial
until agreement was reached on price and structure. SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 3. The Seventh
Circuit subsequently declined to rehear the case, but did modify the opinion. The amended opinion
adopted a neutral posture toward Greenfield, and acknowledged the conflict in the law. Michaels, 767
F.2d at 1187. The court stated explicitly that it did not decide the issue of whether merger negotiations
between publicly held corporations are material before the parties have agreed on price and structure. Id.
63. 786 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986).
64. Levinson, 786 F.2d at 744-45.
65. Id. at 747.
66. Id. at 748.
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The court held that merger negotiations become material by virtue of the
corporation having made a statement about the negotiations. The reason-
able investor, the court said, having received the no corporate development
statement, would think the news of preliminary merger negotiations an
important fact in making an investment decision. 67
II. ANALYSIS
The courts are not giving adequate weight to the protection of investors,
particularly those who sell their stock during merger negotiations. The
potential for abuse of information is often overlooked. Protection should be
given to investors by imposing more stringent disclosure requirements on
management. Management, however, needs predictable rules that enable it
to know when sensitive events must be disclosed. Management cannot
simply be told to disclose the presence of merger plans when they become
important to the reasonable investor. The courts have the ability and the
responsibility to formulate some clear disclosure rules that provide incen-
tives for avoiding misleading or selective disclosure of such information,
and to provide for public announcement when selective disclosure can no
longer be avoided.
A. Materiality of Merger Negotiations
As judged by traditional standards, many preliminary merger negotia-
tions are important to the reasonable investor. Courts continue, however, to
rely on fictions like immateriality to justify their policy decisions.68 This
67. Id. The court did not squarely reach the issue of whether mergernegotiations are immaterial as a
matter of law absent any disclosure. Id. at 748-49.
68. Merger negotiations are held immaterial as a matterof law on policy grounds; they are immaterial
because they have too dramatic an effect on the market and on shareholders. First, the courts reason that
early disclosure will often drive the price of the target corporation's stock up so far that the acquiring
corporation will not be able to afford the purchase. Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1206 (3d Cir.
1982). (Anotherpossibility, not mentioned by the courts, is that the acquiring corporation will simply pay
the higher price. The price increase may impose a corresponding loss on shareholders of the acquiring
corporation. Consequently, overall shareholder wealth may stay the same or decrease.).
Second, the negotiating parties cannot make disclosure of preliminary merger negotiations without
misleading shareholders. Id. at 1206-07. See Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751,756 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985); Reiss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir.
1983). It is important to remember that Staffin was a tender offer case. It stated a claim under Rule lOb-5
and under § 14(e). The court placed explicit reliance on several cases which held that facts relating to
possible competing bids are immaterial and need not be disclosed until a firm offer has been made. See
Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. H. K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388,398 (8th Cir. 1976); Berman v. Gerber
Prods., 454 F Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Scott v. Multi-Amp Corp., 386 F. Supp. 44, 65 (D.N.J.
1974). See also Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970) (acquiring
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reliance should be discontinued, since the result may be to allow manage-
ment to make public misstatements about corporate developments.
The materiality of merger plans at any given stage in the development of
the negotiations is extremely variable. 69 Materiality will depend, among
other things, on the size of the corporations involved, the size of the
potential premium, the attractiveness and potential of the takeover target,
and the prospects for successful completion. If the target corporation is an
attractive prospect, merger plans may become material when they are
conceived. On the other hand, if the parties are small corporations and the
prospects for success are unlikely, the negotiations may not be material
until after agreement is reached.
B. Misstatements-Problems of Corporate Publicity
The Greenfield dissent and the SEC assert that corporate silence is the
solution to the problem of misleading statements. Accordingly, it is argued
that the corporation can simply refuse to answer any questions it receives
from analysts, stock market officials, or stockholders. 70 This approach
ignores the realities of disclosure of an event as volatile as merger negotia-
tions. In many situations management will not have the option of remaining
silent. Instead, a rumor will leak out, despite precautions, and management
will be asked to confirm it.
1. The "No Cotporate Development" Statement
The no corporate development statement was traditionally the rote
response to any inquiries about possible negotiations. Analysts conversant
in the language of rote responses often view such statements with skep-
ticism. 7 1
The Levinson court correctly reasoned that a no corporate development
statement calculated to influence the investing public should be interpreted
corporation's tentative plan to merge target after acquisition immaterial); W. PAINTER. THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES CODE AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE § 10.05, at 394 n. 17.
To the extent that cases involving preliminary merger negotiations rely on these cases, theirreliance is
misplaced. The provisions in theWilliams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439,82 Stat. 454 (1968). weredesigned to
alleviate the abuses associated with disclosure of tender offers. See W. PAINTER, supra, § 10.01. For
preliminary merger negotiations, those problems still exist.
69. See 5A JAcoBS, supra note 35, § 61.04[c][ii )forpositions ofthe federal circuitson how probable
a merger must be before negotiations become material.
70. Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 763: SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 14.
71. During the Carnation merger negotiations, for example, a number of investment analysts indi-
cated that they did not interpret the Carnation denial literally. O'Donnell, Silence WasGolden. FORBES.
Oct. 8, 1984. at 41.
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according to what it would mean to the reasonable investor.72 A reasonable
investor would rarely interpret the statement to mean that management
knows of no leaks of admittedly significant corporate developments that
have influenced the market price. The reasonable investor would instead be
led to believe that there were no developments, confidential or otherwise,
that would have influenced the market price.73
2. An Affirmative Disclosure Rule
Commentators have repeatedly called for the use of quantifiable stan-
dards to define materiality. 74 The SEC possesses the power to promulgate a
rule designating a point at which merger negotiations must be disclosed. A
merger disclosure rule would not involve quantitative standards, but would
instead be triggered by an event common to the negotiating process of all
mergers. Possibilities include disclosure when there is an "intent to
merge,"' 75 when a resolution to seek a merger has been adopted, 76 when an
investment banker has been contacted, or when negotiations commence.77
At least two advantages would accrue if an affirmative disclosure rule
were adopted. The investor would be protected against the effects of
widespread trading on inside information that occurs before disclosure in
many cases. Management would also be given a predictable disclosure
standard.
72. Contrastthis with the convoluted reasoning ofthe Greenfielddecision. Thecourtbegins with the
proposition that merger negotiations are immaterial as a matter of law. This fiction is demonstrably false,
as empirical studies have proven the impact of information about merger negotiations on investor
behavior. See supra notes 9-17, 30 and accompanying text. The court then reasons that a statement which
omits a fact labelled immaterial by the court cannot be misleading.
73. The Greenfield court appears to have read the no corporate development statement according to
the state of facts known to management at the time the statement was made. In the Texas Gulf Sulphur
proceeding, the district court used this standard and was reversed on those grounds. SEC v. Texas Gulf
SulphurCo., 401F.2d833,862-63 (2dCir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The court
of appeals for the second circuit stressed that the adequacy of press releases was to be determined from the
investor's point of view. Id.
74. See Blackstone, A RoadmapforDisclosure vs. aBlueprintfor Fraud, 26 UCLA L. REv. 74,85
(1978) (suggesting that the SEC establish specific or quantitative guidelines for disclosure of certain
events); Jennings, Reckers & KneerA Source oflnsecurity:A Discussion and anEmpiricalExamination
ofStandards ofDisclosure andLevels ofMateriality in Financial Statements, 10 J. CORP. L. 639 (1985);
see also 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 25, § 9.22[2][a].
75. This disclosure standard was urged by the plaintiff in Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 757.
76. See, e.g., Reiss v. PanAm. WorldAirways, 711 F2d 11,13 (2d Cir. 1983) (resolutionbyboardto
seek a merger not material).
77. Blackstone, supra note 74, at 85 (disclosure should be required at the commencement of
negotiations, when the terms are set, and when the agreement is concluded).
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3. Problems with an Affirmative Disclosure Rule
Undoubtedly, there is difficulty in framing a sufficiently general dis-
closure rule that would operate across the many factual circumstances that
occur during merger negotiations. A predictable standard necessarily in-
volves a certain amount of arbitrary line drawing. If a rule were to be
predicated on an event that occurred during the negotiations, disclosure of
preliminary merger plans would be required. Yet, under a traditional
analysis, many of those plans would not be material until later in the
negotiating process. In other cases, circumstances might be such that
disclosure would not be required even though the plans had been material
for some time. Furthermore, in circumstances where negotiations were
especially significant, management would still be faced with the problem of
avoiding misleading statements, unless it were allowed to tell all who
inquired that there were no developments. Such a solution would present a
reprise of Greenfield.
An affirmative disclosure rule would produce problems associated with
market impact. Greenfield accepts the premise that early disclosure im-
pedes and sometimes prevents the consummation of mergers. 78 Early
disclosure may force the buyer to increase the premium price solely to
compensate for the increased share price that disclosure produces. 79 This
argument presents a worst case scenario in which investors respond to
disclosure with a frenzy of speculative trading. In turn, the market price is
forced above what the buyer can afford. Any incentive shareholders have to
approve the deal is effectively destroyed.
The notion that early disclosure prevents mergers has never been em-
pirically confirmed. Although empirical evidence measuring how dis-
closure at agreement in principle affects the market exists,8 0 no similar data
demonstrate how disclosure before agreement in principle affects the
market. Specifically, no study shows whether the price does in fact tend to
rise systematically above the expected price the acquiring corporation is
willing to pay. Courts have relied solely on assertions of the business
community and representatives of the stock market. 8 1
One might hypothesize that the market's ability to respond accurately to
disclosure should depend on how much verifiable information the parties
are able to make public. Two situations demonstrate the market's possible
78. Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189
(1985); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1982).
79. Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 756; Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1207-08.
80. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
81. SeeStaffin, 672 F.2d at 1206 (quoting Transcript, HearingsBeforetheSubcomm. onSecuritiesof
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 72 (1967) (statement of Mr. Calvin on
behalf of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc.)).
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reaction. First, if the negotiations have progressed such that both the
negotiating parties can be identified, the market may be capable of assess-
ing the expected range of prices. If the market is operating efficiently, the
share price would be discounted by the possibility that the deal will not
occur.8 2 However, the prediction of the potential premium to be paid is by
no means an exact science. It is not clear that the market can evaluate the
price with enough certainty to support this hypothesis.
83
On the other hand, if the target had not yet found a buyer, investors would
have insufficient information with which to assess the transaction and the
probable price the target would bring. Price increases fueled by optimistic
speculation would be much more likely to rise above the price any potential
buyer is willing to pay.84
The most significant problem posed by automatic disclosure before
agreement in principle is that every target corporation would be put up for
auction at the time of disclosure. This approach imposes serious limits on
management discretion. Despite the prevalence of rumors and unusual
market activity, some corporations successfully maintain silence and pre-
vent leaks until public announcement. 85 Management ought to be able to
maintain silence, even though that silence may be partly dependent on good
fortune in receiving no inquiries. 86 A workable disclosure rule would not be
capable of making that distinction. To the extent that success is attributable
to a careful disclosure policy, a corporation should not be penalized.
4. No Comment
A "no comment" response to an inquiry about the existence of negotia-
tions is not entirely satisfactory, but it does have certain advantages. The
82. See Asquith, supra note 23, at 66.
83. SeePenn, Premiums-WhatDoTheyReallyMeasure?, MERG. &ACQUIS., Fall, 1981, at32 ("In
the end, the premium you pay depends on whatyou believe you can do with the company or assets versus
what others believe they can do. As such, it is a very subjective matter.") (emphasis original).
84. Management is understandably more concerned with problems that competing bids bring about
if disclosure is made when no binding agreement has been reached than it is with aggregate economic
efficiency. See, e.g., J. FtuND, ANATOMYOFA MERGER 68 (1975);DisclosureRulelsDebated, MERG. &
AcQuIs., Jan./Feb. 1986, at 21. See also In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214,
[1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,593 (July 8, 1985) (acquiring
corporation stipulated that it would terminate negotiations if public disclosure was made). One may
question, however, whether this is an appropriate rationale for secrecy. Although competing bids create
problems for individual corporate practitioners, they tend to maximize shareholder welfare.
85. See Meros, Who Knew What When?, BARRON'S, July 19, 1982, at 32 (some pending deals are
well kept secrets).
86. A survey of corporate attorneys indicates that the response to the SEC's position in Carnation has
been to institute more careful disclosure procedures, and to route all inquiries through a single spokesper-
son who routinely indicates that the company has a policy of not commenting on rumors. DisclosureRule
Is Debated, MERG. & AcQuIs., Jan./Feb. 1986, at 21. These are positive developments which may
succeed in reducing the incidence of selective disclosure.
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SEC and the courts imply that no comment is the functional equivalent of
silence.87 This view may be incorrect when there are rumors of pending
negotiations. In these instances, no comment effectively discloses that
someone is negotiating. 88 It may result in a misleading statement if the
negotiations have progressed far enough. It may also be unacceptable if the
person inquiring is a representative of the exchange on which the party's
stock is traded. 89
A no comment policy, however, is the best way to avoid misleading
statements about the presence of merger negotiations. When coupled with a
rule that requires disclosure if the market responds, the disclosure provi-
sions may operate to minimize the impact of selective disclosure and
provide incentives for prevention of leaks.
C. Duty to Disclose If the Corporation Has Been Silent
As discussed above, if a corporation has successfully maintained silence
during the course of negotiations, it may remain silent. This section argues
that some affirmative duties to disclose merger negotiations are necessary
for the protection of investors. In most instances, the timing of disclosure
should be a matter of balancing the interests of management in silence, and
the interests of shareholders in curbing fraud.
1. Duty to Disclose When the Corporation Is Trading Its Own Stock
One consequence of holding that merger negotiations are immaterial as a
matter of law is that a corporation has no duty to disclose even if it trades its
own stock. 90 This problem may arise when a corporate development,
unrelated to the merger negotiations, necessitates a sale or purchase of the
corporation's own stock. For example, in Reiss v. Pan American World
Airways, 91 the board of directors authorized a call of convertible deben-
tures at the same time as it passed a resolution to acquire National
87. See In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22,214, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,596 n.6 (July 8, 1985); Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751,
763 (3d Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985).
88. SeeMaterialityofMergerNegotiations, SEC RulesDiscussed at ABA Meeting, 17 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 2076, 2077 (1985) [hereinafterMateriality ofMergerNegotiations); Anders, supra note
24. at 29.
89. Materiality of Merger Negotiations, supra note 88, at 2077. The NYSE Listing Agreement
requires the listed company to provide any information to the exchange that "it may reasonably require."
NYSE Company Manual, supra note 28, § 202.04. See AMEX Company Guide, supra note 28, § 402;
see also SEC v. Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1976).
90. SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 8; Brown, Corporate Communications and the Federal
Securities Laws, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 741, 783-84 (1985).
91. 711 F.2d II (2dCir. 1983).
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Airlines. 92 Management announced the call publicly, but did not disclose
the resolution. The court reasoned that disclosure of the merger negotia-
tions did not serve the purposes of the securities laws because negotiations
are "inherently fluid" and the outcome is uncertain. 93
Similarly, in Staffin v. Greenberg,94 Bluebird Corporation made a tender
offer for its own shares without disclosing that it was considering a merger.
The court reasoned that merger negotiations are immaterial, because dis-
closure tends to mislead investors and to harm existing stockholders more
than it benefits them. This is because disclosure tends to drive the price up
during the negotiations and imperil the transaction. 95
Even if the policy reasons articulated by the courts are valid, they do not
justify a holding that negotiations are immaterial, when the result of such a
holding is to allow the corporation to trade without disclosure of material
information to its own shareholders. The Greenfield line of cases balances
the corporation's interests against the investors' interests, concluding that
the corporation has important business reasons for nondisclosure that
outweigh the investors' need to know before agreement in principle. 96
Admittedly, the corporation has a valid interest in preserving the secrecy of
negotiations so that the transaction can be concluded with minimal inter-
ference. 97 Shareholders, however, are entitled to full disclosure and fair
dealing by the corporation involved, no matter what corporate develop-
ments are pending. The primary policy justification for Rule lOb-5 is to
protect investors by preventing unfairness and fraudulent transactions. 98
Consequently, the courts misconceive the policy behind the rule when they
apply a balancing test to trading by the corporation in its own shares.
Courts use different standards of materiality for disclosure of merger
negotiations in cases involving identified insider trading. 99 In SEC v. Geon,
Inc., 100 the Second Circuit reasoned that a valid business purpose exists for
conducting negotiations in secret, but does not justify trading on inside
information. 101 "Materiality has a different aspect when inside information
92. Reiss, 711 F.2d at 14.
93. Id.
94. 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982).
95. Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1206-07.
96. Michaels v. Michaels, 767 R2d 1185, 1196 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 797 (1986);
Greenfieldv. Heublein, Inc., 742F.2d751,756 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985);Reiss,
711 F.2d at 14; Staffin, 672 F.2d at 1206.
97. Underlying the courts' reasoning on this issue may be the practical perception that a corporation
cannot suspend all its other activities requiring disclosure while it negotiates the merger, and should not
be penalized for complying with its other disclosure obligations.
98. 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 35, § 6.06.
99. Id. § 61.02.
100. 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1974).
101. Geon, 531F.2dat48.
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is disclosed to a favored few.' 10 2 No court has ever held that merger
negotiations are immaterial when an individual defendant is accused of
insider trading; such a result would be extremely unlikely. Any principled
distinctions between insider and non-insider trading cases dwindle when
the corporation is trading. 103 In both Reiss and Staffin, the corporation
achieved important objectives, each with the help of a group of share-
holders who disposed of their interests to the corporation without being
told that a merger was pending.1°4 The corporation's trading without
disclosure in such circumstances is no more defensible than insider trading.
It should not be condoned by the courts.
2. Duty to Disclose at Agreement in Principle
Although judicial use of the agreement in principle disclosure require-
ment is of relatively recent origin, it has been the recommended disclosure
standard in the business community for some time. 105 Agreement in princi-
ple is a perfectly satisfactory disclosure standard if absolute silence has
been maintained. Delay of disclosure protects the business venture and the
stability of the market, while minimizing unfairness to investors. There is
some indication, however, that the predictability of the agreement in
principle standard may be eroding.
102. Id. The SEC relies heavily on insider trading cases in its amicus brief. See, e.g., SEC v. Shapiro.
494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); SECv. Gaspar, [1985] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,004 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
It asserts that the Greenfield holding will allow insiders to trade freely on news of negotiations. Although
this proposition is a logical extension of Greenfield, it is unlikely to occur, even if the courts continue to
adhere to the Greenfield reasoning when the defendant is not trading. See, e.g., Levinson v. Basic, Inc..
[ 1984-1985TransferBinder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91.801, at 90,013,90,015 n. II ("Thisisnot acase
involving insider trading. . .[so] insider trading cases are [not] applicable or controlling."), rev'd, 786
F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1986).
103. The only identifiable difference is that the trading is done by an entity, not an individual, so that
no personal gain is attained.
104. In Schlangerv. Four-PhaseSystems, 582 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), thecourtdistinguished
Reiss and Staffin from Greenfield on the grounds that, inter alia, both involved failure to say anything
about the merger plans when announcing the transactions in question, and that the announced transac-
tions were unrelated to the merger. Id. at 133. The court failed to state why the factual distinctions were
important. In the absence of trading, a corporation has no duty to disclose all conceivably material
information when announcing a routine corporate event. SeeWilliams, supra note25, at391. The factthat
the corporation is trading gives new significance to the failure to disclose. The corporation should have a
duty, no matter how inconvenient, to disclose nonpublic information that would be material to the
decision of investors who tender their shares.
105. See J. FREUND, ANATOMY OFA MERGER 67(1975); Bromberg, DisclosureProgramsforPubliclv
Held Companies-A Practical Guide, 1970 DUKE L. J. 1139; Fleischer, Corporate Disclosurellnsider
Trading, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan-Feb. 1967, at 129; Flom & Atkins, The Expanding Scope of SEC
Disclosure Laws, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1974, at 109; Williams, Corporate Publicity, supra note
25, at 391.
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Before agreement in principle, it is possible to restrict participation in
and knowledge of the negotiations to a very small group. 10 6 After agree-
ment in principle, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to restrict dis-
closure of the merger plans to a small enough circle of persons to avoid
trading on the undisclosed information. 107 Corporations may be implicated
in insider trading scandals if they prolong the period of secrecy. Further-
more, it may not be desirable to restrict trading, as insiders often wish to
buy shares at this point. 108
Disclosure at agreement in principle facilitates an orderly and predicta-
ble market response to the news. 109 Investors can assess their prospects
accordingly. In contrast, disclosure before the price and terms have been set
may prompt rapid and entirely speculative price increases.
Only when agreement in principle is reached will the parties be able to
disclose most of the information that is essential to an educated investment
decision. Essential information includes not only the price and post-merger
structure articulated in Greenfield,110 but also the identities of both the
parties, and other information bearing on the business logic of the transac-
tion and the prospects of the merged entity. "'1
Staffin and Greenfield hold that once agreement in principle is reached
there is an affirmative duty to disclose the negotiations, regardless of
whether the corporation plans to trade its own stock or anticipates leaks; 112
thus they emphasize the need for flexible and specific standards for man-
agement. 113 This rule is distinguishable from the notion that merger nego-
tiations are immaterial until agreement in principle. The issue of mate-
riality need not be addressed until after it is determined that there is a duty
to disclose material information.
Conceptually, an affirmative duty to disclose is inconsistent with well
established interpretations of Rule 10b-5. Absent command by rule or
statute, affirmative disclosure obligations under Rule lOb-5 are seldom
106. West, Timely Disclosure: The Viewfrom 11 Wall Street, 24 Sw. L.J. 241 (1970).
107. Id. at 243.
108. Id. at245.
109. The market should reflect the value of the offerdiscounted by thepossibility that themergerwill
not occur. See Asquith, supra note 23, at 80-82 (capital market evaluates uncertainty that the merger will
occur).
110. Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751,756 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189
(1985).
111. Id.
112. See Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 756; Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1207 (3d Cir. 1982).
113. Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 756.
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imposed. 114 However, given the need for predictability in this area, such a
rule is warranted. 115
The timing of agreement in principle is no longer as predictable as it once
was. Before the advent of the current round of hostile takeover activity,
agreement in principle was normally a nonbinding agreement that specified
the price, a description of the basic terms of the deal and the more important
conditions of closing. 116 The transaction would then proceed at a com-
paratively leisurely pace until the closing. 117
In many instances that scenario has changed drastically. The market's
appetite for established companies has placed extreme pressure on the
parties to negotiate in secret. 118 They usually aim for a binding agreement
that covers all necessary points before disclosure is made. 119 The negotia-
tions proceed much further, and much more quickly before disclosure than
was previously the case. If the parties think that early disclosure is even a
remote possibility, they tend to accelerate the negotiating process. 120
The Texaco/Penzoil verdict has also raised doubts about the definition of
agreement in principle. That decision made Penzoil's agreement in princi-
ple with Getty Oil presumptively binding, even though the agreement did
not so specify. 121 That holding also places pressure on the parties to
progress much further in the negotiating process before an announcement
is made. 122 It will be necessary in the future for the disclosure standard to
evolve along with the definition of agreement in principle.
3. Duty to Disclose When Unusual Market Activity Occurs
In recent years a great deal of emphasis has been placed on adjusting the
operation of the securities laws to reflect current notions about the efficient
capital market hypothesis. 123 Efficient capital market theory posits that all
publicly available information about a corporation is immediately reflected
114. See supra note 33.
115. Delaying disclosure past agreement in principle may tempt a court to hold that the delay of
disclosure was undue. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
116. J. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER 60-64 (1975).
117. Id.
118. Freund, Mergers & Acquisitions, Nat'l L.J.,Nov. II, 1985, at 13, col. 1.
119. Id. at21.
120. Id.
121. See Riley, Aberration'-Or Lesson in Contracts, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 2, 1985, at 13, col. 1.
122. See Waldman, Texaco Penzoil Case Makes Firms Careful About Merger Moves, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 16, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
123. See Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases, 38 Bus. LAW. 1(1982):
see generally H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE
62-139(1979).
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in the price of its stock.124 A sudden rapid increase in price or volume
without a public statement could indicate that a piece of nonpublic informa-
tion had suddenly become available to certain sectors of the investing
public. 125
The courts have unaccountably refused to entertain any suggestion that
this type of selective disclosure should trigger a public announcement by
the corporation. 126 As in the Greenfield case, many courts allow corpora-
tions a presumption of confidentiality, even if there are material develop-
ments known to management that, if leaked, would produce price in-
creases. 127 Unless management has affirmative proof that somebne has
leaked the information from inside the company, it may presume that the
negotiations are a secret, despite the presence of unusual market activity. 128
This presumption of secrecy parallels a related rule concerning correc-
tion or verification of rumors. The Second Circuit has held that a corpora-
tion has no legal obligation to correct or verify rumors not attributable to
it. 129 This rule operates regardless of whether the rumor has affected the
market price of the stock.
As applied to unusual market activity during merger negotiations, the
plaintiff bears a heavy burden of proof to show that unusual market activity
is attributable to the corporation. The plaintiff must show a breach of
confidentiality by an insider and subsequent trading on the information
substantial enough to produce unusual activity. 130 The plaintiff's burden is
virtually impossible to meet, given the incentives of the corporation and of
insiders to keep the negotiations a secret.
124. SeeDennis,MaterialityandtheEfficientCapitalMarketModel:ARecipefortheTotalMix, 25
WM. & MARY L. REv. 373, 375 (1984).
125. Keown & Pinkerton, supra note 9, at 856.
126. The only case that suggested unusual market activity as a trigger to disclosure was State
Teachers RetirementBd. v. FluorCorp., 500F. Supp. 278,292 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The court ofappeals did
not reverse on the issue of whether unusual market activity was a factor, but held that disclosure was not
required under the particular factual circumstances. State Teacher Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654
F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir. 1981). See Brown, supra note 90, at 781; 5A A. JACOBS, supra note 35, § 88.04.
127. Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1984) (Higginbotham, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189 (1985); Zuckerman v. Harnischfeger Corp., 591 F. Supp. 112,
120 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The SEC's position on this point is unclear. It first suggests that a corporation has a
duty to correct or verify if it is aware that a rumor exists. Later, however, it asserts that correction is only
required if the company is responsible for the leaks. SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 3 n.2.
128. Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 759; Zuckerman, 591 F. Supp. at 120.
129. StateTeacher's Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1983); Elkind v. Liggett&
Myers, Inc., 635 F2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409
F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969). See also Weintraub v. Texasgulf, 564 F. Supp. 1466, 1470 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (no
duty to investigate the source of the rumors).
130. See Sheffey, Securities Law Responsibilities of Issuers to Respond to Rumors and Other
Publicity: Reexamination oja Continuing Problem, 57 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 755, 779 (1984).
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It is not difficult to account for the courts' insistence on proof of
corporate responsibility for rumors before a duty to disclose arises. A
strongly ingrained notion exists that, at least with respect to the general
disclosure obligations under Rule lOb-5, the corporation ought to be
allowed to control the timing of disclosure to coincide with the best
interests of the business, so long as it abstains from trading its own stock. 131
The rationale is that a corporation is subject to potential fraud liability for
misleading statements every time it issues a statement. It should not be
forced to disclose unless it is necessary to correct a previous mistake or
error. 132
The practical problems associated with correction of rumors are also a
factor in the insistence on proof of responsibility for rumors. Commen-
tators have argued that a corporation cannot practically discover and correct
all the rumors about it. For a large corporation that generates large amounts
of news, even correcting the rumors of which it is aware would be a serious
undertaking. Often management is not in a position to know whether or not
the information is correct. 133 A company might be susceptible to black-
mail, especially in the context of a hostile takeover or competitive bidding,
if the adversary could force premature disclosure of plans by creating a
rumor about the price or terms of the current negotiations. 134
At least with respect to undisclosed merger negotiations, these ra-
tionales are invalid. Most of the practical problems will not apply when a
rumor of a development as important as merger negotiations is translated
into unusual market activity. Publicly traded corporations can make a
practice of monitoring the trading in their stock. 135 They are put on notice
that the rumor exists. Likewise, rumors of merger negotiations do not
involve facts that management has to investigate before it can make
accurate disclosure. 136
More importantly, once a rumor has generated unusual market activity,
the timing of disclosure is already outside the corporation's control. Man-
agement has no good alternatives to disclosure when unusual market
activity occurs. All that management achieves by withholding public
disclosure is to slow the rise in price that occurs as the market assimilates
the rumor. Nondisclosure merely delays the point at which the rapid
131. See State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir. 1981); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n. 12 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969); Sheffey, supra note 130, at 778-79; Bauman, supra note 35, at 939.
132. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 867 (Friendly, J., concurring).
133. Sheffey, supra note 130, at775-76; 5A A. JAcOBs, supra note 35, § 88.04[b]; Allen, supra note
35, at 496.
134. Sheffey, supra note 130, at 776.
135. Id.
136. See id.
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increase occurs in response to public announcement, and lessens the
business inconvenience associated with early disclosure.
From the point of view of investors and the market, requiring disclosure
of merger negotiations when unusual market activity occurs would be a
significant improvement. Disclosure is consonant with the very explicit
rules of all the major exchanges. 137 The exchanges advise corporations to
use the greatest care in insuring the secrecy of such negotiations. Present
law, however, provides inadequate incentives to insure that negotiations
stay secret. 138
Disclosure when unusual market activity occurs is consistent with good
corporate practice, and would impose no new burdens on corporations that
generally seek to comply with the law. 139 Corporate practitioners advise
that allowing unusual market activity to proceed, unexplained, causes
damage to the company's reputation that outweighs the benefits of a short
period of continued secrecy. 140
Disclosure serves the underlying purposes of the securities laws. The
market is protected against the prolonged effects of selective disclosure of
material information. Disclosure provides a sorely needed disincentive
against insider trading that is not dependent on SEC enforcement against
identified individuals. Market integrity is promoted. 141 Finally, disclosure
insures that investors who have no special sources of information and are
less adept at following market signals have important information before
them in an understandable form. Any other rule would imply that investors
who fail to watch the Dow Jones tape do so at their own peril. 142
137. NYSE Company Manual, supra note 28, § 202.01. Once unusual market activity occurs,
"frank and explicit announcement is clearly required. Id. § 202.03. American Stock Exchange require-
ments are even more explicit. They refer to the sensitivity of merger negotiations, AMEX Company
Guide, supra note 28, § 402, and give specific instructions about how to deal with unusual market
activity. Id.
138. The national exchanges' sanction for failure to disalose is a suspension of trading. See 3B H.
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 25, § 9.10[4]; Brown, supra note 90, at 778 n.149 (suggesting that the
competitive pressures among the exchanges detersuspension of trading when it is actually necessary); see
also Freund, Selected Acquisition Problems Under Rules l0b-5 and l0b-6 and Under Section 16(b), in
EIGHTH ANNUAL INST. ON SEC. REG., 233, 246-47 (1977).
A private right of action is probably not available for violation of the exchange rules that require
disclosure when unusual market activity occurs. See State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654
F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1983); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 817 (1966); 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 25, § 9.10[4]; see also Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co.,
614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980).
139. See Fleischer, supra note 105, at 134-35; West, supra note 106, at 245.
140. See, e.g., J. FLOM, B. GARFINKLE& J. FREUND, DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLIC COM-
PANMIES AND INSIDERS 231 (1967).
141. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphey, supra note 18, at 816.
142. Cf. Dennis, supra note 124 (unusual market activity should obviate the need for disclosure
because investors can read the market signals); Friedman, Efficient Market Theory and Rule lOb-5
Nondisclosure Claims:A Proposalfor Reconciliation, 47 Mo. L. REv. 745 (1982).
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Greenfield and Staffin assert that disclosure of negotiations is inherently
misleading to investors. 143 The SEC argues in its brief for the Michaels case
that if disclosure of negotiations has to be made, it can occur without being
misleading. 144 The SEC's position is better reasoned. Effective truthful
disclosure need not contain play-by-play descriptions of the negotiations.
The fact that the parties are negotiating is a verifiable piece of information.
It can be disclosed without misleading, so long as the corporation empha-
sizes that the outcome is uncertain and cannot be predicted. 145 If manage-
ment makes it clear that any investments during the negotiations would be
highly speculative, existing shareholders would be provided with informa-
tion consistent with the disclosure philosophy of Rule lOb-5.
The argument that disclosure should not be required fails to take into
account the empirical evidence summarized above, which indicates that
any presumption that confidentiality has been maintained is, in most
instances, thoroughly unsupported by the facts. 146 Corporate management
may presume a lack of confidentiality beginning about two weeks before
the time that agreement in principle is disclosed.
III. CONCLUSION
The recent treatment of disclosure of merger negotiations under Rule
lOb-5 shows an increasing willingness by the courts to compromise the
protection of investors in favor of management convenience, by holding
preliminary merger negotiations immaterial as a matter of law. The results
are unfortunate. Stock markets continue to labor under the effect of
unexplained increases in price. Widespread trading on inside information
continues unabated until agreement occurs.
The courts should respond to the problem of leaks of information by
creating some affirmative disclosure obligations applicable to corporations
which are involved in merger negotiations. Negotiating companies should
143. Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1189
(1985); Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1206 (3d Cir. 1982).
144. See SEC Amicus Brief, supra note 7, at 7.
145. Id. The SEC refers to Schedule 14D-9, at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1985), relating to tender
offers as a guideline for disclosure of necessary information. Schedule 14D-9 requires disclosure by a
target corporation of negotiations being undertaken in response to a proposed tender offer which would
result in an extraordinary transaction. Item 7 suggests that:
If no agreement in principle has yet been reached, the possible terms of any transaction or the
parties thereto need not be disclosed if in the opinion of the Board of Directors of the subject
company such disclosure would jeopardize continuance of such negotiations. In such event, dis-
closure that negotiations are being undertaken or are underway and are in the preliminary stages will
be sufficient.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1985).
146. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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be obligated to make every effort to keep negotiations a secret until there is
agreement in principle. If unusual market activity develops, or if the
corporation wants to trade its own stock, however, there should be a legal
obligation to make prompt disclosure.
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